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This paper analyzes the impact of uncertainty on the spread of stock market crises,
both theoretically and empirically. The e®ect of uncertainty about the fundamentals
on investment decisions is an important cause of ¯nancial crises propagating across
countries. Firstly, a coordination game on investment illustrates the increasing e®ect
of a surprise crisis in one country on the probability of a crisis in a second country
through higher uncertainty there. An anticipated initial crisis generates the opposite
e®ect. Secondly, these theoretical predictions are tested empirically. Fixed e®ects panel
estimations validate the impact of the initial crisis on uncertainty in potentially-a®ected
countries. Subsequently, probit estimations con¯rm the positive impact of uncertainty
on the crisis probability in the a®ected economy. The results are robust across various
speci¯cations.
JEL classi¯cation: C 72, D 82, D 84, F 21, F 32, F 34, F 41
Keywords: Capital Flows, Government debt, Sudden Stops,
Global Games, Coordination Failure
¤I would like to thank Fernando Broner, Antonio Ciccone, Pablo Fleiss, Harald Fadinger, Malte Geib,
Michael Grimm, Christian Holzner, Francisco Pe~ naranda, Thijs van Reens, Monika Schnitzer, Jaume Ven-
tura, seminar participants at the University of Munich and Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona as well as participants
at the Spring Meeting of Young Economists 2007 for their helpful comments and suggestions. Additionally,
I would like to thank Gaston Gelos for provision and information regarding part of the data set used in the
empirical part of the paper. All remaining errors are mine. I thankfully acknowledge ¯nancial support by
the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the Kurt Fordan Foundation.
yMunich Graduate School of Economics, University of Munich [MGSE, Kaulbachstr. 45, 80539 Munich,
Germany email: fritzi.koehler@lrz.uni-muenchen.de]1 Introduction
Financial crises in emerging markets in recent years have been especially centered around
the Mexican (December 1994), the Thai (July 1997), and the Russian (August 1998) crises.
Financial markets witnessed a similar accumulation of crises in developed countries in the
context of the crisis of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (September 1992).1 These
periods of crises concentration suggest contagion e®ects across countries.
Because of the high costs of these ¯nancial crises in emerging markets, researchers and
practitioners have been exploring these cases. Speci¯cally under investigation are the mecha-
nisms through which crises spread, the factors that render countries vulnerable to contagion,
and, most importantly, which policies might help prevent contagion.
This paper addresses these questions by analyzing one particular mechanism of the spread
of crises: the contagion of crisis through uncertainty about the fundamentals. Recall that
in the present study the term uncertainty describes the dispersion of private opinions of
investors on the state of the fundamentals in a particular country. The present paper focuses
on ¯nancial crises characterized by a severe plunge in stock market returns. Contagion is
de¯ned as the propagation of crises across countries beyond what would be implied by
common shocks.2
It can be observed that, after a number of crises, the disagreement about the fundamentals
in other markets { especially those markets that are later on themselves hit by a crisis {
increases. Figure 1 illustrates this observation in the case of the Thai crisis in 1997.3 As
illustrated in the graph, the uncertainty not only increases in Thailand after the crisis, but
also in neighboring countries. Korea, for example, is characterized in the data by a build-up
of uncertainty after the Thai crisis. Korea is then hit by a currency crisis in November 1997.
In addition, Figure 1 shows that the crisis in Thailand does not have an e®ect on the degree
of uncertainty in Taiwan and the UK, neither were these countries economically strongly
a®ected by the crisis.
However, in the case of other ¯nancial crises, careful scrutiny reveals that uncertainty
about the fundamentals decreases in other markets after the crisis in the initial market.
For example, this is the case in the period around the Argentinean crisis in 2002, which is
illustrated in Figure 2.
The recent literature distinguishes between surprise crises as, for example, the Thai
crisis in 1997 and anticipated crises as, for example, the Argentinean crisis in 2001/2002.
1See, for example, Broner, Gelos, and Reinhart (2006), Caramazza, Ricci, and R. (2004), or Kaminsky,
Reinhart, and Vegh (2000) for the dates of the crises.
2See Didier, Mauro, and Schmukler (2006) for this de¯nition. Henceforth, I will use the terms contagion,
spread, transmission, and propagation of crises interchangeably.
3The left Y-axis displays the crisis variable. The two bars in the ¯gure show the two most pronounced
crisis events in the Thai crisis: First, the severe devaluation of the Bath in the beginning of July 1997 and
second, the substantial drop in stock market returns one month later. The dates are chosen in accordance
with Kaminsky et al. (2000) and Goldstein (1998). The right Y-axis displays the uncertainty about the
fundamentals in the tracked economies. Uncertainty is measured by the standard deviation of growth
forecasts for the current and following year, by ¯nancial analysts within the tracked countries. For more
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Figure 1: Uncertainty in the surroundings of the Thai crisis
This literature argues that the international repercussions of the anticipated crises in Brazil
(January 1999), Turkey (February 2001), and Argentina (December 2001) were much less
important than those after the crises in Mexico (December 1994), Thailand (August 1997),
and Russia (August 1998).4
This paper picks up this distinction and shows that surprise crises increase uncertainty
about fundamentals in other countries, thereby resulting in a higher probability of crises
there. In contrast, the occurrence of anticipated crises decreases disagreement about the
state of the fundamentals in other countries, thereby lowering the probability of a crisis
there.
The present analysis contributes to the literature in two ways: First, uncertainty about
the fundamentals is theoretically illustrated as a factor transmitting crises across markets.
Second, predictions of the theoretical model are validated empirically. The role of uncertainty
about the fundamentals has been neglected in the existing literature on contagion. So far,
common investors have been detected as the main reason of the spread of ¯nancial crises
between economies. While early research focused on trade linkages5 and on macroeconomic
similarities between economies6, more recent analyses converge to the view that common
creditors are at the core of contagion. This view is supported by a large number of empirical
4See Kaminsky et al. (2000) or Didier et al. (2006)
5See, for example, Gerlach and Smets (1996).
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Figure 2: Uncertainty in the surroundings of the Argentinean crisis
analyses.7
Based on the insight into the role of common investors, the theoretical literature sug-
gests di®erent propagation mechanisms. Research thus far examines herding due to ¯xed
information cost8, di®erently informed investors9, changes in investors' risk aversion10, and
wealth e®ects11 as possible propagation channels for crises.
Following Goldstein and Pauzner (2004), I model the ¯nancial crisis in country B as a
coordination game between private investors. The reason for using a coordination game is
that the set up of a coordination game is well suited to analyze the e®ect of uncertainty about
the fundamentals. The present model di®ers from the Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) set up
in two crucial ways. The ¯rst di®erence concerns modeling the initial-crisis country and
the potentially-a®ected subsequent country. While Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) explicitly
model the sequence of two bank-run crises of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) type, I focus
on the second economy exclusively. I model the occurrence of a crisis in the second country,
assuming that either a surprise crisis takes place in the ¯rst country or an anticipated crisis.
The second di®erence concerns the mechanism through which the crisis spreads. In
Goldstein and Pauzner (2004), the crisis spreads due to a wealth e®ect. In my set up, the
7See, for example, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) and Caramazza et al. (2004).
8See Calvo and Mendoza (2000).
9See Kodres and Pritsker (2002).
10See Broner et al. (2006).
11See Goldstein and Pauzner (2004).
3change in uncertainty about the fundamentals transmits the crisis. I assume that uncertainty
about the fundamentals increases in the second country if a surprise crisis hits the ¯rst
country. Further, I assume that uncertainty decreases if an anticipated crisis occurs in the
¯rst country. The illustrative model in this paper is then used to show that an increase in
uncertainty increases the probability of a crisis in the second country while a decrease in
uncertainty makes a crisis less likely there.
This study o®ers two justi¯cations of the assumption that a surprise crisis in an initial-
crisis country increases the uncertainty in another country: The ¯rst justi¯cation is the
empirical evidence presented in Figures 1 and 2. The second justi¯cation is the following
line of arguments: If a crisis hits a country by surprise, i.e., without investors expecting
the event, investors learn that they did not put su±cient e®ort into information processing
given existing data-processing technology. If they want to predict crises in other countries,
they have to increase their investment in information processing. However, a number of
the investors realizes losses in the ¯rst country and, hence, are less inclined to invest in the
second economy.12 Given the assumption that the payo® of one agent positively depends on
the fraction of other agents investing, i.e., that strategic complementarity prevails between
investments, this leads to all agents optimally choosing to spend less on their information
processing after the crisis in the ¯rst country.13 As a result, all agents receive more dispersed
signals about the true value of the fundamentals.
This mechanism about how the degree of uncertainty depends on a crisis in a ¯rst country
works in the opposite direction if an anticipated crisis materializes. In this case, investors'
trust in their information processing is strengthened and they are willing to spend a higher
amount on gathering information, despite the crisis in the ¯rst market. This higher e®ort in
information processing, in turn, leads to more precise signals.
The present model illustrates the presence of contagion in a coordination game: In coun-
try B, in¯nitely many investors (agents) have one unit of endowment available for investment
there. If they choose not to invest, they receive a certain return of zero. In case that they
invest, the return depends positively on the fraction of other agents who invest. In addition,
the return decreases with an increasing level of the fundamentals. A high level of fundamen-
tals indicates high costs of investing (this could be due to high political instability or high
transaction costs). The fundamentals of the economy are uniformly distributed over a ¯nite
support. However, investors cannot observe the true realization of the fundamentals but re-
ceive a private signal that is symmetrically and uniformly distributed around the realization
of the true fundamentals.14 This means that investors base their investment decisions on the
expected return, given their private evaluation of the fundamentals.
This information structure yields a threshold equilibrium in terms of the fundamentals in
B and the outcomes in A. Below the threshold, the investors coordinate on investing; above,
12This is an outcome of the model by Goldstein and Pauzner (2004).
13The assumption of strategic complementarity is common in the global game literature.
14This assumption was ¯rst introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) who developed the technique
of global games, which was then applied, for example, to self-ful¯lling currency crises in Morris and Shin
(1998).
4no one invests. Comparative static analysis shows that the threshold is a decreasing function
of the dispersion of the private signals. The dependence of the uncertainty in B on the crisis
in A together with the result of the comparative static analysis of the threshold in B are
su±cient to illustrate the existence of contagion: A surprise crisis in country A increases
the dispersion of the private signals, i.e., the support of the private signals around the true
value of the fundamentals, in B and hence, decreases the threshold there. The decrease in
the threshold means that coordination on the bad equilibrium becomes more likely, i.e., a
crisis becomes more probable. In the case of an anticipated crisis in country A, the opposite
is true.
To validate empirically the uncertainty channel of contagion, I construct a rich data set
for 38 countries with monthly time series (December 1993 to September 2005). This country
sample and the associated time frame enables the inclusion of the following six pronounced
crisis periods into the analysis: Mexico (1994), Thailand (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999),
Turkey (2001) and Argentina (2001). The two main variables in the data set are a stock
market crisis dummy and an uncertainty measure. A stock market crisis is detected by sig-
ni¯cant negative variation in stock market returns. The monthly stock market returns that
serve as a basis for the crisis dummy are computed from the IFC (International Finance
Corporation) investable US dollar total return index.15 When necessary, I complete the re-
turns with data from MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) or national sources. The
measure of uncertainty is the standard deviation of GDP growth forecasts between country
experts. Additionally, I employ a large set of domestic control variables and alternative
channels of contagion.
I proceed in two distinct steps. Firstly, I use ¯xed-e®ects panel estimations to establish
the link from the initial crisis in country A to the uncertainty in other countries B. I control
for country and time e®ects, running various robustness checks. Secondly, I quantify the
e®ect of uncertainty in those economies on the probability of a crisis there. For this second
step, I employ pooled probit estimation, controlling for country and time e®ects. Again, I
control for potential domestic drivers of crises. Finally, as a check for alternative channels
of contagion, I control for contagion through common creditors, trade links, the size e®ect
of the initial stock market, and for overexposed common fund investors.
The empirical analysis in this paper expands the existing empirical literature on the
spread of crises in several respects. First, the e®ect of uncertainty in the context of the
spread of crises has been neglected so far. Second, as the panel data spans a larger time
horizon, I can consider a larger number of crises periods.16 Third, I control for a large number
of alternative contagion channels, adapting them to the particular kind of crises analyzed
{ namely, substantial stock market drops. Fourth, including control for time e®ects results
in very strict tests for the transmission channels of crises. The time-e®ects control takes
15The investable indices take into consideration restrictions on foreign investment. Therefore, this measure
represents the part of the national stock markets accessible to foreign investors, which is relevant in the
context of contagion.
16For example, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) only consider the Mexican, Thai, and Russian crises,
while Broner et al. (2006) analyze the Thai, Russian, and Brazilian crises.
5care of all e®ects present at a particular point in time. In case of all emerging markets,
the time-e®ects control for increases in the interest rates in the ¯nancial centers. Not all
of the alternative contagion channels controlled for remain signi¯cant when controlling for
time e®ects.
The analysis yields two main empirical ¯ndings. The ¯rst ¯nding is that uncertainty
about the fundamentals is a propagation mechanism of contagion, if the ¯rst country is hit
by a surprise crisis. The ¯rst step of the analysis ¯nds that the Mexican, Thai, and Russian
crises increase the uncertainty in potentially-a®ected countries. The e®ect is stronger within
the region where the crises occur; the e®ect appears more pronounced in countries nearer to
the initial crises country. The second step of the analysis ¯nds that the e®ect of uncertainty
on crisis probability in countries B is positive, signi¯cant, and, as shown by marginal e®ects,
not negligible in size.
The second ¯nding is that in the case of an anticipated crisis, uncertainty about the
fundamentals in the second economy is decreased, which, in turn, decreases the probability
of a crisis there. The ¯rst step of the analysis yields the following result: The Brazilian,
Turkish, and Argentinean crises decrease the uncertainty in the potentially-a®ected countries.
The e®ect is stronger within the region where the crises occur and in countries closer to the
initial-crisis country. The second step of the analysis con¯rms that the e®ect of uncertainty
in the potentially-a®ected countries on the probability of a crisis there is positive, signi¯cant,
and not negligible.
These ¯ndings have several implications. The ¯rst, obvious implication is that a close
monitoring of the fundamentals in the resident country and also of other countries is crucial.
Particularly other countries in the ¯rst-country region and geographically close ones should
be focused on. Surprise crises seem to be especially bad because they set o® mechanisms
that further worsen the situation. This paper illustrates such a mechanism through the
uncertainty about the fundamentals. The second implication is that, once a surprise crisis
has hit a ¯rst country, policy makers in potentially-a®ected countries should move toward
policies that diminish the potential increase in uncertainty. One venue could be to develop
mechanisms for such situations through which governments could credibly disseminate very
precise information about the state of their economy so that the private signals get as
precise as possible. One could even start to think about subsidies for information-gathering
technology.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe the model. In section 3, I present
the empirical analysis. Section 4 explains policy implications while section 5 contains the
conclusion.
2 The Model
This section presents a simple coordination game to illustrate the occurrence of contagion
between two markets that are uncorrelated in terms of their fundamentals. The focus of
the model is on the potentially-a®ected country. In an investment game, I illustrate that a
6crisis in country B becomes more probable after a surprise crisis in country A and becomes
less probable after an anticipated crisis materializes in a ¯rst country. The transmission
functions through the uncertainty about the fundamentals. For the theoretical illustration
of this channel, three ingredients are necessary. A ¯rst ingredient is that the dispersion of
private signals in country B increases due to a surprise crisis in country A and, conversely,
that dispersion of private signals decreases due to an anticipated crisis in country A. In
this study this e®ect of a crisis on uncertainty about the fundamentals is introduced as an
assumption.17
The second ingredient is a unique threshold equilibrium in terms of the fundamentals
of the economy, so that it is possible to attribute to each level of the fundamentals the
realization of the investment or the non-investment equilibrium. Once this unique thresh-
old equilibrium is determined, the third ingredient is the comparative static analysis of
the threshold equilibrium with respect to the uncertainty about the fundamentals. If the
threshold shifts with changes of the uncertainty, contagion is present.
The assumption that a surprise crisis in an initial-crisis country increases uncertainty
about the fundamentals in another country can be justi¯ed by the empirical evidence pre-
sented in the introduction. Additionally, it could be argued that investors learn after a
surprise crisis that they did not put su±cient e®ort into information processing, given ex-
isting data-processing technology. If investors want to predict crises in other countries, they
must increase investment in information processing. However, a number of the investors re-
alize losses in the ¯rst country and, hence, are less inclined to invest in the second economy.18
Given the assumption that the payo® of one investor depends positively on the fraction of
other agents investing, i.e., that strategic complementarity prevails between investments,
this leads to all investors choosing optimally to spend less on information processing after
the crisis in the ¯rst country.19 As a result, all investors receive more dispersed signals
about the true value of the fundamentals. The mechanism works in the opposite direction
if an anticipated crisis materializes in the initial-crisis country. In this case, investor trust
in information processing is strengthened. Therefore, investors are willing to spend a higher
amount on gathering information despite the crisis in the ¯rst market. This in turn leads to
more precise signals.
The notion of a surprise crisis and an anticipated crisis in the ¯rst crisis country are
absent in the setting of Goldstein and Pauzner (2004). However, the idea of the distinction
between surprise crises and anticipated crises is consistent with the set up of a global game.
Think of a surprise crisis in the following way: If the prior expectation about the value of
the true fundamentals is lower than the threshold equilibrium, investors, on average, expect
that no crisis will happen. If the fundamentals are then realized in the range above the
threshold, this realization can be interpreted as a surprise crisis. On the other hand, if
the prior expectation about the value of the true fundamentals is higher than the threshold
17It is an interesting topic for future research to explicitly model this e®ect.
18This is an outcome of the model by Goldstein and Pauzner (2004).
19The assumption of strategic complementarity is common in the global game literature.
7equilibrium, investors expect the bad equilibrium to be realized. If is the bad equilibrium is
then realized, this can be interpreted as an anticipated crisis.
2.1 Model Set Up
Here, I describe the game in country B taking as a given the outcomes in the initial crises
country A.20
The realizations of the investment environment are assumed to be uniformly distributed
over the ¯nite interval µ » [¸ µ; ^ µ]. A high value of the fundamentals µ signi¯es an adverse
environment for investment with high investment obstacles.
There is a continuum of [0;1] identical investors . Each investor decides whether to invest
1 unit or not. If an investor does not invest, he receives a certain return of 0. If he decides
to invest, he receives an uncertain return of P(µ;¼¡i), which depends negatively on the level
of fundamentals µ and positively on the fraction of other investors that invest in B, ¼¡i. A
strategy is de¯ned as ¼i : [¸ µ; ^ µ] ! [0;1], which means that investor i invests in state µ with
probability ¼i(µ). Due to the mass of agents being 1, the fraction of agents who invest at
a particular state of fundamentals can be expressed as
R 1
0 ¼j(µ)dj = ¼¡i(µ) for j 6= i. The
positive dependence on the fraction of other agents investing, i.e., strategic complementarity
between the agents, can be explained by increasing returns on aggregate investment. These







in which R¼¡i(µ) stands for the simplest form of a return that is positively dependent on
the fraction of other agents investing. Further, the last term can be interpreted as a cost of
investing that increases exponentially with the worsening of the investment environment.
An investor decides whether to invest or not to invest in a country after receiving in-
formation about the fundamentals of the country. Assuming that the fundamentals are not
common knowledge, each investor privately interprets publicly available information. The
investors thus act upon their private signals. The private signals are uniformly distributed
in an ´ surrounding of the true fundamentals µ: µi » U[µ ¡ ´;µ + ´]. Now, the variance of
the signals depends on the outcomes in country A. In the case of a surprise crisis in country
A, the private signals are uniformly distributed in an ´ + c surrounding of µ, with c being a
small positive number. In case of an anticipated crisis in A, the private signals are uniformly
distributed in an ´ ¡ d surrounding of µ, with d being a small positive number.
An investor is more likely to invest if 1) the obstacles to invest are lower and 2) if a
large number of other investors invest in the same country. However, in line with global
games literature, I assume that there are small ranges at the extremes of the support of
the fundamentals where investors have dominant strategies. If the fundamentals are very
20The investment game in country B is a straight application of the theory of global games by Carlsson and
van Damme (1993). Similar investment games have been used in the literature, for example, by Heinemann
(2005).
8good, i.e., if the investment obstacles are very low, it is optimal for an investor to invest
irrespective of the actions of all the other investors. On the other extreme, if the state of the
fundamentals is very adverse to investment, then it is the optimal strategy of an investor
not to invest, irrespective of the actions of the other investors.
Formally, this assumption means that the support of the fundamentals has to exceed
the border of the dominance region by at least 2´: ¸ µ + 2´ < µ < µ < ^ µ ¡ 2´, in which µ
stands for the border of the lower dominance range and µ stands for the border of the upper
dominance range. This condition ensures that an investor is indi®erent between investing
and not investing at the borders of the dominance ranges. At the border of the dominance
region at the high end of the support, the investor is indi®erent, even if the fraction of other
agents investing equals 1, P(µ;1) = 0. At the border at the dominance region at the low
end of the support, the investor is indi®erent even if no one else invests, P(µ;0) = 0. When
an investor receives a signal µi < µ ¡ ´, he knows that his payo® P i > 0, no matter what
all the other investors are doing. Therefore, he will invest. Analogously, if he receives a
private signal µi > µ + ´, he knows that P i < 0, no matter what all the other investors
are doing. Therefore, he will not invest. In contrast, between the borders of the dominance
regions, the payo® of an investor depends on the actions of other investors. This results in a
tripartite partition of the fundamentals. Under common knowledge, multiple equilibria exist
in this intermediate range of fundamentals. However, the assumption of private information
eventually allows for ¯nding a unique equilibrium. This is the purpose of the next section.
2.2 Solving the Model
Firstly, I will show that the game with private information is characterized by a unique
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in country B.
Proving the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium requires several steps. In
the ¯rst step, a simple switching strategy is assumed to be followed by all investors. In the
second step, the monotonicity of the expected payo® di®erence in the private signal has to
be proved. Based on this, dominated strategies can then be iteratively eliminated in the
third step, beginning at borders of the dominance regions. Finally, it has to be shown that
there is only one unique value of the level of debt, for which the payo® di®erence, given the
private signal, equals zero. This level of debt is the threshold value, below which all agents
invest and above which no one invests.
In the private information game, a strategy is a function of the private signal received
instead of the true value of the fundamentals: ¼i(µi) : [¸ µ; ^ theta] ! [0;1].21 The payo®
function of an investor now depends on his private signal on the state of the fundamentals










21Note that the private signal is drawn from the same support as the true value of the fundamentals. No
private signal will be realized at a level of debt that is, in reality, nonexistent. As noted earlier, the support
of the true value of the fundamentals must exceed the borders of the dominance regions su±ciently, i.e., by
2´, so that there exist private signals that are consistent with those dominant strategies.
9Analogously, the fraction of other agents investing ¼i(µi) is a function of the private
signals µj they receive.
In the ¯rst step towards the unique equilibrium, it is assumed that all investors follow
a simple switching strategy. A switching strategy IT means that an investor invests with
probability one if, and only if, the signal it receives is below a threshold T and abstains from
investing with probability one if the signal is above the threshold22
IT =
(
1 if µi < T
0 if µi ¸ T
(3)
The simple switching strategy permits rewriting the payo® function, replacing the fraction
of other investors investing with the probability that one other investor receives a signal that







j · T) (4)
P(µ
i;IT) = R ¢ 1 ¢ prob(µ
j · T) + R ¢ 0 ¢ prob(µ






Recall that at the borders of the dominance regions, the investors are indi®erent between
investing and not investing.23 If the payo® function is monotonically decreasing in the
private signal, clearly, these borders are the lowest and the highest possible threshold signals
for the switching strategies. In the dominance region at the low end of the support of the
fundamentals, the investment obstacles are so low that the payo® of an investor is positive
if investing, irrespective of the actions of all other investors. At the border itself an investor
is, then, indi®erent. In the dominance region at the high end of the support, the investment
obstacles are so high that the payo® of an investor is positive if investing, irrespective of the
actions of all other agents. In the case of a monotone payo® function, the borders of the
dominance regions are, therefore, the starting points of the iterative elimination of dominated
strategies.
Accordingly, in a second step towards the unique equilibrium, the monotonicity of the
payo® function in the private signal has to be shown.
Lemma 1 P(µi;IT) is strictly monotonically decreasing in the private signal µi.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
Due to the strict monotonicity of the payo®, the lowest possible threshold for a switching
strategy of all the investors is µ. Similarly, the highest possible threshold is µ. For all µi < µ,
the payo® is positive, irrespective of the actions of all other investors. As the rationality of
22Continuity arguments show that such a simple switching strategy is optimal. Therefore, generality is
not lost when imposing it in the ¯rst place.
23More precisely, each investor is indi®erent at the border of the high dominance region, given that all
other investors invest P(µ;1) = 0 or at the border of the dominance region at the high end of the support,
if no one else invests P(µ;0) = 0.
10the investors is common knowledge, not to invest is a dominated strategy for signals below
µ. At the other extreme, for all signals µi > µ, the payo® di®erence is negative.
Due to the strategic complementarity between investors, the worst scenario that an in-
vestor must consider is the case where IT = Iµ. This case means that for all values of the
fundamentals in the multiplicity range, investors choose not to invest although the funda-
mentals would, in case of coordination on the high growth equilibrium, also allow for this.
The best scenario would be a switching strategy of IT = Iµ.
At this point, it is possible to start the iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
This iteration permits cutting the multiplicity range down to a unique threshold signal. The
elimination functions as follows: If an investor i receives a signal that is very close to the
border of the dominance region, the probability that other investors receive signals within
the dominance region and, thus, have a dominant strategy is very high. Due to the strict
monotonicity, this su±ces to induce the investor i to have a dominant strategy as well. This
is true for all the investors. Therefore, the range between the signal of investor i and the
former border of the dominance region can be added to the dominance region. Performing
this addition at both ends of the support and iterating this process leads to the maximum
[minimum] signal at which investor i is indi®erent between investing and not investing; this
signal has to be, at the same time, the threshold of the switching strategy of all other
investors.24
According to Milgrom and Roberts (1990), in all games with strategic complementarity
the set of strategies that resist the iterative elimination of dominated strategies are limited
by Nash equilibria. Nash equilibria are not eliminated through this process. Thus Iµ? and
Iµ
? are the most extreme Nash equilibria of the game. No Nash equilibrium exists below µ
?




Steps one and two enable the third step in the proof of the uniqueness of the equilibrium.










i) = 0 (6)
has a unique solution. This can be expressed in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 There exists only one value, for which the expected payo® equals 0 given that
investor i receives exactly the threshold signal µ? as a private signal, and given that all other
investors have a switching strategy, in which the switching signal equals exactly µ?.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
This unique solution is
µ







The three steps can be summarized in the following proposition:
24For a more formal consideration of the iterative elimination, please see Appendix 6.
11Proposition 1 There exists a unique threshold equilibrium µ? of the game with imperfect
information, such that any investor i invests if and only if µi · µ? and does not invest if
µi > µ?.
Proposition 1 permits the conclusion that µ? identi¯ed by Equation (7) is the unique
threshold equilibrium of the game with private information.
2.3 Results and Implications
The unique threshold equilibrium allows to show that an increase in the degree of disagree-
ment about the fundamentals in country B increases the probability of a crisis there.
Proposition 2 A crisis becomes more likely to occur in country B if a surprise crisis hap-
pens in country A. A crisis becomes less likely to occur in country B if an anticipated crisis
materializes in country A.
Proof. To prove Proposition 2, it su±ces to calculate the comparative statics of the unique
threshold equilibrium in terms of the fundamentals with respect to ´.















´) < 0 (8)
This result implies that the threshold below which all investors invest shifts to the left
(right), i.e., to better (worse) levels of the fundamentals, if the dispersion of private signals
around the true value of the fundamentals increases (decreases) due to a surprise (antici-
pated) crises in country A. Thereby, the probability space of the good equilibrium is reduced
(increased) and, hence, a crisis becomes more (less) likely in the case where private signals
are dispersed in an ´ + c (´ ¡ d) surrounding of the true fundamentals, as opposed to the
case where they are only dispersed in an ´ surrounding.
Due to the assumption that higher uncertainty results from a crisis in another country,
e.g., Thailand in the case of Korea, the shift of the threshold can be viewed as an incident
of contagion.25
Figure 3 illustrates the comparative static analysis. The payo® is plotted against the
level of the fundamentals. µ?0
B lies at lower levels of the fundamentals than µ?
B as described
above due to ´ +c being a higher value than ´. Clearly, the threshold based on a dispersion
of private signals ´ ¡ d would lie at higher levels of the fundamentals than µ?
B.
2.4 Testable Hypotheses
In this section, the predictions of the theoretical model are translated into testable hypothe-
ses. From Proposition 2, two testable hypotheses can be derived:


















B as a function of the dispersion of private signals in country B
Hypothesis 1 The occurrence of a surprise crisis in a ¯rst country makes a crisis in a
second country more likely through an increase in uncertainty about the fundamentals in the
second country.
Hypothesis 2 The occurrence of an anticipated crisis in a ¯rst country makes a crisis in a
second country more likely through a decrease in uncertainty about the fundamentals in the
second country.
3 Empirical Analysis
The purpose of this section is to validate the predictions of the theoretical model. I focus on
showing the e®ect of uncertainty about the fundamentals as a channel through which crises
spread from one ¯nancial market to another.
3.1 The Data
A rich data set is used comprising monthly observations of di®erent alternative crisis mea-
sures as the dependent variable, a measure of uncertainty as the main explanatory variable,
and a large set of control variables.26 The data run from December 1993 to September 2005.
The sample comprises 38 countries { 15 developed and 23 emerging { where the selection
of the period and countries re°ects the existence of uncertainty and return data.27 I ex-
clude the initial crises countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey)
from the set of potentially-a®ected countries. Although this means a non-negligible loss in
observations, this procedure is in favor of ¯nding convincing results.
The explanatory variable that is most interesting for the current analysis is uncertainty
about the fundamentals. I use the standard deviation of growth forecasts by a group of
country experts as a measure of uncertainty. In models similar to Morris and Shin (1998),
uncertainty takes the form of the dispersion of private signals around the true value of the
fundamentals. In the current model, this is the dispersion of the private signals about the
26Please refer to Table 2 in Appendix 6 for detailed descriptions of the time series and their calculation.
27For details, please refer to Table 1 in Appendix 6.
13true value of the investment environment. Such data is not directly observable. However,
investment environments correlate strongly with the country levels of GDP and associated
growth. Hence, the available data by Consensus Economics on the standard deviation of
GDP growth forecasts between experts in an economy seems a reasonable proxy.28
To measure the signi¯cant drops in stock returns, a crisis dummy variable is constructed.
Monthly stock market returns, computed from IFC (International Finance Corporation)
investable US dollar total return index, serve as a basis for this crisis dummy.29 When
needed, I complete the returns with data from MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International)
or national sources.30 I construct a binary crisis variable of severe drops in stock market
returns, in which a month is counted as a crisis month if the total return undershoots its
sample mean by more than two standard deviations. After this initial drop, the subsequent
months are also counted as crisis months until the return reverts into the one standard
deviation band around the sample mean.31
I use a rich set of domestic control variables. Most important are the mean of the
growth expectations by Consensus Economics to control for the status of the economy and
its evaluation by investors. Additionally, I disentangle the e®ect of uncertainty about the
fundamentals from e®ects linked to the volatility of stock market returns, which I include
as a control variable into the regressions. Following Broner et al. (2006), I use the ICRG
(International Country Risk Guide) indices of ¯nancial, economic, and political risk as a
summary statistics to control for the state of the fundamentals in the potentially-a®ected
country. Then, domestic liability dollarization, TOT growth, and credit growth are included
as further control variables.
Numerous alternative mechanisms of contagion appear to be relevant in the context of
stock market drops. Speci¯cally, I control for contagion through common creditors. In line
with Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), I use consolidated data of BIS banking statistics
to construct an index of contagion through the presence of a common creditor. However,
I construct a di®erent index than their index. The index used in this paper re°ects the
dependence on common creditors as opposed to their measure that re°ects the competition
for funds. In the context of stock market drops, the dependence appears more relevant
than competition for their funding.32 Another relevant channel of contagion is trade with
the crisis country. Following Glick and Rose (1999), I use bilateral export data from the
IMF Direction of Trade Statistics to construct the measure of trade contagion. However, in
28Please refer to Koehler (2006) for detailed arguments why this measure is a good proxy of the dispersion
of private signals around the true fundamentals of an economy. See Table 2 in Appendix 6 for a description
of the exact construction of the variable. In the main analysis, I use a weighted average of current and
following year forecasts as described in Table 2. However, as a robustness check I repeat all estimations with
the current year, and all estimations with following-year forecasts, separately. The results are qualitatively
the same and quantitatively similar.
29The investable indices take into consideration restrictions on foreign investment. Therefore, this measure
represents the part of the national stock markets accessible to foreign investors, which is relevant in the
context of contagion.
30For more details, please refer to Table 2 in Appendix 6.
31I run the regressions with variants of this measure, i.e., 1:5 standard deviations and also 3.
32For detail on the construction of this index, please refer to Table 2 in Appendix 6.
14contrast to their contagion measure, I use the export share to country A in total exports.
For the control of contagion through common overexposed fund investments, I use the index
developed by Broner et al. (2006). I interact the alternative contagion measures with the
crisis dummies for country A. It seems natural that the contagion variables only play a role
for the uncertainty in country B if there is a crisis in country A to begin with.
3.2 Methodology
The goal of this study is to show that uncertainty about the fundamentals has a separate
and non-negligible e®ect on the spread of crises apart from the channels already studied. If
the goal of the present study were to prove the relevance of uncertainty and its predominant
role relative to other potential explanatory variables in spreading ¯nancial crises, the best
procedure to prove this point would be a two-step instrumental variable estimation.33
In the context of analyzing contagion, it would be di±cult to ¯nd a valid instrument for
the uncertainty in country B. Arguing, for example, for the use of the crisis in country A
as an instrument for the uncertainty in B requires the crisis in A to signi¯cantly a®ect the
uncertainty in B but not to directly a®ect the probability of a crisis in country B and not to
a®ect it through a channel di®erent from uncertainty. The existing literature on alternative
channels of contagion already proves the last assumption wrong. Other variables linked to
the crises in A, which might serve as instruments for the uncertainty in B, would have the
same problem: they are likely to also feed into alternative channels of contagion.
Given the presence of alternative contagion channels other than the uncertainty chan-
nel and therefore the impossibility of ¯nding a valid instrument for uncertainty in B, this
empirical analysis is designed in the following way:34 In a ¯rst step, the e®ect of the crisis
in country A on the uncertainty in a second country B is estimated. To ensure that the
e®ect of the crisis in A on the uncertainty in B is correctly quanti¯ed, I control for potential
domestic drivers of uncertainty. I also control for country and time e®ects. Thereby, I em-
ploy a very strict test on the e®ect of uncertainty on the occurrence of a crisis. The control
for time e®ects is often avoided in the literature. In the second step, I analyze the e®ect
of uncertainty in country B on the probability of a crisis there. In this step, I run probit
regressions estimating the e®ect of the uncertainty in B on the probability of crises there.
I control for domestic factors that could trigger crises and also for alternative contagion
channels. Additionally, I control for country and time e®ects.
One drawback of this approach is that in contrast to an instrumental variable estimation,
reverse causality from the crisis in B on the uncertainty there cannot be entirely ruled out.
However, as described in more detail in subsection 3.3.2, I run a number of regressions to be
con¯dent that this possibility is minimized in the chosen set up.
33A good example of a convincing instrumental variable estimation is Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2001) who analyze institutions as opposed to geography as explanation of di®erences in current dispersion
of countries' incomes.
34In section 3.3.2, the reasons for this design are described in further detail.
153.2.1 Methodology Used to Estimate the E®ect of the Initial Crisis on the
Uncertainty in Potentially-a®ected Countries
To analyze the relevance of the uncertainty channel of contagion, I proceed in two distinct
steps. In the ¯rst step, I pin down the e®ect of the crisis in country A on the uncertainty in
a second country B. In the second step, I analyze the e®ect of uncertainty in country B on
the probability of a crisis there.
In step one, I estimate two sets of regressions. Firstly, I specify the following test:
uncB;t = ®0
+ ®1d crArg;t¡1 + ... + ®6d crTur;t¡1
+ ®7d crB;t¡1 + ®8macrocntrlsB;t + ±B + "B;t (9)
with B = 1;2;:::;32;t = 1;2;:::;141,
where uncB;t signi¯es the uncertainty in the potentially-a®ected country B at time t. I ex-
clude the initial crises countries Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey in
the panel as potentially-a®ected countries. Therefore, the index B represents the 32 remain-
ing countries in the sample. d crA;t¡1 signi¯es the lag of the crisis dummies in the initial-
crisis countries A, representing Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey.
The dummy variable takes a value of 1 if there is a signi¯cant drop in the stock market
return. macrocntrlsB;t¡1 stands for the set of domestic control variables described in section
3.1. ±B stands for country speci¯c e®ects. The level of uncertainty varies strongly across
countries. Systematically, some countries are characterized by higher uncertainty than other
countries, therefore, requiring control for country e®ects. I run ¯xed-e®ects regressions to
accommodate this fact. Finally, "B;t stands for the error term.
Controlling for time e®ects in the above setting is not possible because the average e®ect
of each of the initial crises on the uncertainty in all the countries contained in the sample is
estimated. As the coe±cients for each of the crises are forced to be the same in the regression
in all the potentially-a®ected countries, it could be that the coe±cients of the time dummies
capture part of the e®ect that actually comes from the crisis variable. To circumvent this
problem, I interact the crisis variable with the distance between the crisis variable and the
potentially-a®ected countries. I employ the distance variable ¯rst used by Rose (2004). This
creates heterogeneity in the crisis variable across countries, which is necessary to be able to
control for time e®ects.
Therefore, I run additional regressions based on the following equation:
uncB;t = ®0
+ ®1d crArg;t¡1disArg;B + ... + ®6d crTur;t¡1disTur;B
+ ®7d crB;t¡1 + ®8macrocntrlsB;t + ±B + °t + "B;t (10)
where all the abbreviations have the same meaning as in Equation (9). Additionally, the
16terms disArg;B and °t stand for the distance from initial-crisis country to the potentially-
a®ected country B and for the time e®ects, respectively. To estimate Equation (10), I also
run ¯xed-e®ects panel regressions, additionally controlling for time e®ects.
3.2.2 Methodology Used to Estimate the E®ect of the Uncertainty on the Prob-
ability of a Crisis in Potentially-a®ected Countries
For the analysis of the e®ect of uncertainty on the probability of a crisis in a potentially-
a®ected country, I specify the following estimation equation:








(d crA;t¡1) + ±B + °t + "B;t)
(11)
with B = 1;2;:::;32;t = 1;2;:::;141.
Since this study is interested in the increase of the probability of a crisis, I employ probit
estimations. Hence, G(:) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. ctgA;B;t¡1
represents the alternative channels of contagion from country A to country B: common
creditors, trade, dependence on a common overexposed fund investor, and ¯nally also the
market size of the crisis country. These are interacted with the crises in the initial-crisis
countries taking into account that it is important to control for their e®ect in transmitting
those crises to country B. I also include the interaction of uncertainty with the crises because
it is the e®ect of uncertainty { if a crisis in country A takes place { which is of interest.
Probit models do not lend themselves to consistent estimates of the coe±cients in a ¯xed
e®ects regression. Hence, instead of a ¯xed-e®ects panel estimation, a pooled probit intro-
ducing dummies can capture the country e®ects and time e®ects. Additionally, I estimate
a linear probability model to overcome the potential incidental-parameter problem that can
arise in the described procedure. As a plausibility check, I repeat the regressions with the
continuous return as dependent variable and run simple OLS regressions.
Using the interaction term of the uncertainty measure in B with the sum of crises variables
in countries A as a regressor implies the following risk: It could be that the coe±cient on
this term simply picks up the direct e®ect of the crises in A on a crisis in B. To ensure
that this is not the case, I estimate a set of regressions, in which I enter the uncertainty
variable and the initial crises variables separately. In these very simple regressions, I use the
17following speci¯cation:
Prob(d crB = 1jxB;t¯0) = G(¯0
+ ¯1d crA;t¡1 + ... + ¯6d crA;t¡1
+ ¯7uncB;t¡1 + ¯8mgexpB;t¡1 + ±B + "B;t)
(12)
with B = 1;2;:::;32;t = 1;2;:::;141.
Again, the abbreviations stand for the same variables as before. Furthermore, I put the
mean growth expectations explicitly in Equation (12) to emphasize that it is used in this
simple regression as a summary of the situation of country B.
3.3 Results
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the uncertainty channel of contagion does
play a role in spreading crises across markets. First, I ¯nd a signi¯cant and robust e®ect
of the initial crisis on the uncertainty in potentially-a®ected countries. Second, I ¯nd a
signi¯cant and robust e®ect of the uncertainty in the second country on the probability of a
crisis there.35
3.3.1 The E®ect of a Crisis in an Initial-crisis Country on the Uncertainty in a
Potentially-a®ected Country
The analysis of the e®ect of an initial crisis on disagreement about the fundamentals in
potentially-a®ected countries shows an interesting pattern: I ¯nd that the Mexican, Russian,
and Thai crises signi¯cantly increase disagreement about the fundamentals in other countries.
The literature identi¯es these crises as surprise crises.
However, in the case of the three other crises in the sample { the Brazilian, Turkish,
and Argentinean crises { the panel analysis shows a di®erent pattern: The Turkish and Ar-
gentinean crises signi¯cantly decrease the uncertainty in potentially-a®ected countries. The
e®ect of the Brazilian crisis is less clear. The literature identi¯es these crises as anticipated
crises.
These results are robust to choosing regional sub-samples, emerging markets sub-samples,
and including a large number of control variables. Table 5 summarizes the results of the
¯xed-e®ects panel regressions with those sub-samples.
35In the following, I show the results calculating the stock market returns from the MSCI index, using a
return drop of more than 2 standard deviations below the sample mean as crisis criterion and employing a
weighted average of current and following year GDP forecasts as basis for the uncertainty measure. However,
I have run the estimations also with the return data from IFC, with two variations of the crisis criterion,
and with the current year and the following year forecasts separately. The results of these di®erent sets
of analyses are qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar. Therefore, I do not include them in this
paper.
18(Table 5 here)
The di®erent columns in Table 5 correspond to the regression results from di®erent sub-
samples. Column 1 shows the coe±cients of the ¯xed-e®ects panel regression of uncertainty
in all potentially-a®ected countries on the crises in all the initial crises countries and a set
of control variables. Column 2 displays regression results of the regression of the crises in all
initial crises countries on uncertainty in emerging market economies. Columns 3 to 10, then,
show results for regressions of the regional crises in the sub-samples of all economies (columns
3, 5, 7, 9) and only the emerging economies (columns 4, 6, 8 and 10) within Asia (columns 3
to 6), within Eastern Europe (columns 7 and 8) and within Latin America (columns 9 and
10).
In all regressions, the lag of the 1994 Mexican, the 1998 Russian, and the 1997 Thai
crises have a signi¯cant and positive e®ect on the uncertainty in the potentially-a®ected
countries. Comparing columns 9 and 10 with columns 1 and 2 reveals that the e®ect of the
Mexican crisis is stronger on uncertainty in Latin American countries (they are all emerging
countries, which explains why columns 9 and 10 are identical) than on the entire sample of
countries or the sub-sample of all emerging economies. A crisis event in Mexico leads to an
increase of the standard deviation of growth expectations across country experts of 0.174
percentage points in Latin American countries. The Mexican crisis exerts a smaller e®ect
on uncertainty in the sample of all emerging markets, increasing the standard deviation of
growth expectations by 0.059 percentage points. This e®ect is slightly bigger than the one
observed in the sample of all countries, where the increase is 0.044 percentage points.
The same pattern holds for the Russian and Thai crises. However, for these two crises,
the di®erence in the magnitude of the e®ect within their own region, compared to the e®ect
on the entire sample of countries, is not as large as for the Mexican crisis. The e®ect of
the Thai crisis on uncertainty in emerging Asia is an increase of 0.123 percentage points of
the standard deviation, while its e®ect on all Asian countries is a bit smaller: 0.112. In the
sample of all emerging markets, the e®ect of the Thai crisis is 0.085 percentage points and
in the sample of all the countries, the e®ect is 0.063. While the Russian crisis increases the
standard deviation of growth expectations in Eastern European countries by 0.145 percentage
points, its e®ect on all emerging and all countries amounts to 0.086 and 0.048 percentage
points only.
These results suggest that the Mexican crisis has the strongest e®ect on uncertainty
in other countries, in magnitude within its own region among the three mentioned crises.
However, the Mexican crisis has less impact beyond its own region than have the Russian
and the Thai crises. Furthermore, these results suggest that the Thai crisis has the biggest
e®ect of all three crises in the developed world.
A closer look on results for the 2002 Argentinean, the 1999 Brazilian, and the 2001
Turkish crisis reveals a di®erent picture. While the Argentinean crisis decreases the standard
deviation of growth expectation by 0.146 percentage points in Latin American countries, the
19e®ect is weaker in the sample of all emerging markets and all countries: a decrease of 0.039
and 0.026, respectively. In case of the Brazilian crisis, only the decrease of 0.027 percentage
points of standard deviation of the growth expectation in the sample of all countries is
signi¯cant at the ¯ve-percent level, while the e®ect of this crisis is insigni¯cant in all the
sub-samples. The Turkish crisis delivers the same pattern as the Argentinean crisis. However,
the Turkish crisis presents one interesting additional ¯nding. First, estimating the e®ect of
the Turkish crisis in the sub-sample of Eastern European countries shows that the Turkey
crisis yields a decrease of uncertainty of 0.043 measured in the standard deviation of growth
expectations in those countries. Second, estimating the e®ect of the Turkish crisis in the
subsamples of emerging Asian countries and all Asian countries, the e®ect is much stronger:
There the crisis in Turkey results in a decrease of 0.1 and 0.074 percentage points respectively.
These results suggest that the negative e®ects of the Argentinean and Turkish crises
on uncertainty in potentially-a®ected countries are stronger within their own regions than
beyond. The Turkish crisis shows a bigger e®ect in Asia than in Eastern Europe. The e®ect
of the Brazilian crisis is less clear.
The coe±cients on the control variables used in the regressions have the expected signs.
In particular, as expected, the lag of the mean of the growth expectations impacts uncertainty
negatively. This variable can be seen as a summary of the state of the fundamentals and the
expectations about it. If the fundamentals are good { or everyone expects them to be good {
then disagreement about the fundamentals decreases. The lag of the crises in the potentially-
a®ected countries shows a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on uncertainty. Past stock market
volatility also has a strong positive and signi¯cant e®ect on uncertainty.36 Additionally, I
use the ICRG ¯nancial, economic, and political risk indices as summary of the fundamentals
following Broner et al. (2006). The coe±cients on these variables are mostly not signi¯cant
in the regressions.
To further ensure the robustness of the e®ects that the above regressions reveal, I run a
second set of regressions, controlling for time e®ects. As explained in section 3.2.1, controlling
for time e®ects in the above setting is not possible. To circumvent this problem, I interact
the crisis variable with the distance between the crisis variable and the potentially-a®ected
countries.37 This creates heterogeneity in the crisis variable across countries, making control
of time e®ects possible. Clearly, the meaning of the explanatory variable is slightly changed.
Now additionally, whether the distance in the sense of Rose (2004) increases or decreases the
e®ect of a crisis on the uncertainty in the potentially-a®ected countries, makes a di®erence.
I repeat the above ¯xed-e®ects panel regression, replacing the lagged crises variables for
the Argentinean, Brazilian, Mexican, Russian, Thai, and Turkish crisis with the interaction
36By introducing the stock market volatility, I lose India from the sample and also lose a non-negligible
amount of observations. Therefore, I have run all the regressions also without the stock market variable.
The results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. For this reason only the results including the
stock market variable are displayed. In regressions without the stock market volatility, the coe±cient on
past crisis in country B is slightly higher.
37By using the distance variable, I lose Slovakia and Taiwan, for which the distances to the initial crises
countries are not available in the data set underlying Rose (2004).
20term between those crises variables with the distance to the potentially-a®ected countries
and control for time e®ects in addition. Table 6 in Appendix 6 displays the results. The
overall pattern of e®ects remains the same as in the ¯rst set of regressions. The e®ects are
still highly signi¯cant. The only exception is the coe±cient on the interaction term of the
Russian crisis with the distance variable in the regressions with the samples of all and of all
emerging markets, which become insigni¯cant.
As the e®ect of the crises in the initial countries on uncertainty becomes smaller, the
question arises whether this stems from the interaction of the crises with the distance or
from the control for time e®ects. To disentangle these two cases, I also run regressions with
the interaction variables without controlling for time e®ects. The results are displayed in
Table 7 in Appendix 6. The regression results are very similar to the ones where I control
for time e®ects. This result suggests that the interaction with the distance variable explains
the lower coe±cients and thus the weaker e®ect of the crisis in the initial-crisis countries
on uncertainty; the control for time e®ects is not driving this result. Hence, it is safe to
say that the e®ect of the initial-crisis country diminishes with an increasing distance. Taken
together, these regression outcomes con¯rm the observations from the ¯rst set of regressions.
The results are robust against the inclusion of time e®ects.
To summarize the ¯ndings of the ¯rst step of the analysis: The analysis shows that the
Mexican, the Russian, and the Thai crises signi¯cantly increase uncertainty in potentially-
a®ected countries. The e®ect is stronger within the region where the crisis takes place. The
Argentinean, the Turkish, and, to a lesser extent, the Brazilian crises decrease uncertainty in
potentially-a®ected countries. These last three crises have a stronger negative e®ect within
their region. The e®ect appears to decrease with increasing distance.
These ¯ndings are in line with the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model. Recall
that surprise crises increase uncertainty in other countries, while anticipated crises decrease
uncertainty in other countries. The ¯ndings regarding the di®erent regional e®ects are not
captured by the theoretical model.
3.3.2 The E®ect of the Uncertainty on the Probability of a Crisis in a Potentially-
a®ected Country
In the second step of the analysis, I show robustly that uncertainty in the potentially-a®ected
country increases the probability of a crisis there. These results are summarized in Tables 8
to 12.
Firstly, I run a pooled probit regression of the crises in the potentially-a®ected countries
on the interaction of uncertainty in country B, with the sum of all initial crises countries,
controlling for a set of variables including country and time e®ects. Apart from the controls
for country and time e®ects, these variables classify in two categories: 1) domestic control
variables and 2) alternative contagion channels, which could in°uence the likelihood of a
crisis in the potentially-a®ected countries. Table 8 displays the results. The results of the
pooled probit estimations including country and time controls are displayed in column 1 for
21the sample of all countries and column 2 for the sample of all emerging market countries.
The estimation results of the linear probability model are shown in columns 3 and 4. The
outcomes of the simple OLS regressions with the continuous return variable as dependent
variable appear in columns 5 and 6.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 show the lag of uncertainty interacted with the sum of crises
in all initial crises countries has a positive and strongly signi¯cant e®ect on the probability
of a crisis in the potentially-a®ected country. The e®ect is stronger in emerging economies.
Introducing the dummies into the pooled probit regression does not seem to create a severe
incidental parameter problem. The magnitude of the e®ect is, indeed, smaller in columns
3 and 4 but the e®ect is still strongly signi¯cant and not negligible. The e®ect of the
uncertainty on the continuous return variable in columns 5 and 6 not being signi¯cant is
not problematic. The theoretical model is about crises, which are extreme events. The
regression with the continuous return variable as regressand is a plausibility check, only. For
example, if an increase in uncertainty increased the return, while simultaneously increasing
the probability of a crisis, this would worry.
Secondly, I run the regressions with the interaction of uncertainty with the sum of the
crises in Mexico, Russia and Thailand. These are the crises identi¯ed to increase the uncer-
tainty in other countries. The results of these regressions are summarized in Table 9.
(Table 9 here)
Clearly, the e®ects of uncertainty are stronger in the current regression than in those with
all initial crises countries.38 Here, also the coe±cients of the uncertainty term are signi¯cant
when using the continuous return variable as regressand.
Calculating marginal e®ects makes clear that the e®ect of the uncertainty on the prob-
ability of crises in the potentially-a®ected countries is not negligible. Details are shown in
Table 12.
(Table 12 here)
The control variables have the expected signs. With regard to country characteristics
the following variables are controlled for: the lag of the mean growth expectations, the lag
of stock market volatility, and the ICRG risk indices for economic, ¯nancial, and political
risk.
38This ¯nding goes beyond what is explained by the theoretical model, which would not distinguish the
intensity of an increase or decrease of uncertainty after a surprise crisis or an anticipated crisis.
22With regard to alternative contagion channels, the following variables are controlled for:
the common creditor channel of contagion, the direct trade channel, contagion from im-
portant stock markets, and contagion through common overexposed fund investors. I use
slightly di®erent de¯nitions than the literature to construct the index of common credi-
tors and the index of trade share with the initial-crisis country. The de¯nitions that I use
are more plausible in the context of stock market drops, rather than the existing indices
which have been developed to study contagion of currency crises. Section 3.1 explains the
construction of these variables exactly. I estimate regressions, which include the channel
through overexposed fund investors separately, and show the results in Table 10. This is due
to the fact that I have the index of overexposed common creditors only for the sample of
emerging markets without Ukraine.39
The market size of the initial-crisis country turns out to be not signi¯cant in the regres-
sions (see Tables 8 to 10). If not controlling for overexposed common fund investors, I ¯nd
that common creditors and trade share have a high explanatory power for the occurrence of
a crises in the potentially-a®ected countries (see Tables 8 and 9). However, if I introduce
the control of the overexposed common fund investor index, these two variables become in-
signi¯cant, which makes them appear not entirely robust, at least in the emerging market
sample, for which I can test the overexposure channel. Notably, the overexposure channel
cannot signi¯cantly contribute to the explanation of the continuous fund returns in columns
5 and 6 in Table 10, while Broner et al. (2006) ¯nd a signi¯cant e®ect. This di®erence could
stem from the severe test with control for country and time e®ects that I run in the present
analysis.
As explained in section 3.2.2, care must be taken to ensure against only picking up the
direct e®ect of the crises in the initial-crises countries when interacting the uncertainty in
B with the sum of crises in the initial-crises countries. The results in Table 11 show that
the uncertainty has a distinct positive and strongly signi¯cant e®ect on a crisis event in the
same economy.
The possibility of reverse causality is not tackled in this second step of my empirical
analysis. This problem could arise if the crisis in B itself caused the uncertainty to increase.
There are two answers to this concern: First, the present analysis is interested in the un-
certainty that is caused by crises elsewhere. I show robustly that a crisis in A signi¯cantly
in°uences uncertainty in country B. In this step, reverse causality is unlikely. Hence, this
part of the analysis is not a®ected by the endogeneity concern.
The problem arises only in the second step. Here, singling out perfectly the uncertainty
caused by the crisis in country A is not possible. However, interacting uncertainty in B
with the crises in the initial crises countries and, at the same time, controlling for domestic
causes of increased uncertainty provides the second answer to the endogeneity concern. The
interaction allows to consider exclusively the relevant time periods. Therefore, uncertainty
39I am very thankful to Broner et al. (2006) for making their overexposure index available to me. Due
to the expensive underlying source data, I would not have been able to control for this relevant contagion
channel otherwise.
23caused by the crises in the other countries should be especially high. Additionally, control-
ling for the fundamentals in country B in the same regressions corrects for domestic causes
of increased uncertainty in B. As a check in the second step, I estimate a set of regressions,
in which I include uncertainty and crisis indices for the initial crises countries both as sep-
arate explanatory variables. Also in these regressions, the e®ect of uncertainty is positive
and strongly signi¯cant. In a follow-up check, I run a further set of regressions, including
exclusively either the crises indices in countries A or the uncertainty in B as explanatory
variables. The coe±cient of uncertainty does not change signi¯cantly. Thereby, I make sure
that the uncertainty has a separate e®ect on the probability of crises in B from the direct
e®ect of the crisis in A.
Instrumental variable estimation is not an answer to the endogeneity concern in the
present set up. Instrumenting uncertainty, for example, by its past realizations does not
help. In the case where the instrument reaches far enough back into the past, the instrument
might be realized before the crises in the initial-crisis country. It would then pick up exactly
the part of uncertainty that is not of interest in this analysis. Therefore, the series of checks
conducted in the present study appear to be the best available option.
These arguments support plausibility and reliability of the results. Further soundness
comes when taking these arguments together with the results of the analysis on sudden
stops in Koehler (2006). There is shown the strongly signi¯cant e®ect of uncertainty on the
occurrence of a crisis after taking care of the endogeneity problem.
Together with the ¯ndings in section 3.3.1, the sets of regressions in the current section
support the theoretical model. Uncertainty in potentially-a®ected countries increases with
the occurrence of a surprise crisis in initial-crises countries. In turn, this increase in un-
certainty leads to an increase of the probability of a crisis in potentially-a®ected countries.
In case of an anticipated crisis in the ¯rst country, the uncertainty in the second country
is reduced. In turn, this decreased uncertainty decreases the probability of a crisis in the
second country. The fact that the coe±cients on the interaction term in Table 8 are larger
than those in Table 9 suggests that the decreasing e®ect of a decreasing uncertainty on the
crisis probability after an anticipated initial crisis is weaker than the increasing e®ect of an
increased uncertainty after a surprise crisis in the initial-crisis country on the crisis proba-
bility. However, the weaker results in Table 8 could also stem from the Brazilian crisis not
having a clear-cut e®ect on the uncertainty in potentially-a®ected countries.
These empirical results align with the theoretical model. First of all, a large part of the
literature agrees that there was much less international response in form of crisis in other
countries to the Brazilian, the Turkish, and the Argentinean crisis than to the three other
crises.40 Additionally, Didier et al. (2006) and Mondria (2006) argue that the Brazilian,
Turkish, and Argentinean crises were anticipated by the investors while the Mexican, Thai,
and Russian crises caught them by surprise.
40See, for example, Kaminsky et al. (2000) or Didier et al. (2006).
244 Policy Implications
The ¯rst, obvious implication of my analysis is that investors and governments should closely
monitor fundamentals also of other countries, especially in the region and in adjacent coun-
tries. Surprise crises appear to be especially bad because they set o® mechanisms that worsen
the situation further. This paper illustrates such a mechanism through the uncertainty about
the fundamentals.
Second, once a surprise crisis has hit a ¯rst country, governments need to apply policies
that counteract the increase in uncertainty about the fundamentals in country B. One
venue could be to develop mechanisms for such situations through which governments could
disseminate credibly very precise information about the state of their economy. In this
model, I have not been concerned with credibility issues, so I can only infer something about
a credible government. In reality, governments might not be credible { they might be tempted
strongly to signal that the fundamentals in their country are very satisfying. However, one
way toward overcoming the credibility problem and helping private investors receive more
precise private signals, would be to allow full access to the government accounts to a few
independent institutions, which could then sell the information to private investors. Such a
procedure ensures that private investors have private information but with little dispersion
around the true value of the fundamentals. Another venue would be to think about subsidies
for information-gathering technology.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I illustrate the uncertainty channel of contagion in a coordination game and
then validate the predictions empirically. In particular, I ¯nd that surprise crises in an
initial-crisis country such as the Mexican, Thai, or Russian crises increase the probability of
a crisis in other countries. In the case of an anticipated crisis such as the Brazilian, Turkey,
or Argentinean crises, uncertainty is reduced making crises in potentially-a®ected countries
less likely. Additionally, the empirical analysis shows that the e®ects through uncertainty
are stronger in potentially-a®ected countries within the same region as and closer to the
initial-crisis country.
The results of the present analysis suggest that investors and governments should closely
monitor the fundamentals of neighboring countries to minimize the risk of a surprise crisis.
Second, policy makers should take uncertainty about the fundamentals into account. Once a
surprise crisis happens elsewhere, policy makers should be ready to counteract the increase in
the disagreement about the fundamentals by adequate policies. Strategies that help private
investors receive precise private signals appear prudent in the light of this analysis.
The present analysis also con¯rms the ¯ndings of the relevance of other contagion chan-
nels especially through overexposed fund investors, also through trade links and common
creditors. However, on top of these channels, which have been analyzed by the literature
for some time, uncertainty does play a role in explaining contagion patterns. And, as the
25analysis of marginal e®ects shows, the e®ect is not negligible.
In this paper, I have taken the change in dispersion of the private signals in the second
economy as given if a crisis happens in the ¯rst country. A worthwhile future research agenda
is to explicitly model the optimal choice of spending on information-gathering technology.
This would result in an endogenous change in dispersion of the private signals in the second
market.
As to the empirical analysis, future research moving to higher frequency data, if available,
could be worthwhile. This step might allow the exploration of more convincing ways of
determining the direction of causality.
266 Appendix
6.1 Lemma Proofs
6.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1 (Monotonicity of P)
Proof. The monotonicity of P in µi can be very easily shown: In
P(µ
i;IT) = R ¢ prob(µ










0 if T < µi ¡ 2´ and T > µi + 2´
< 0 if µi ¡ 2´ < T < µi + 2´





is strictly decreasing in µi. As a consequence, P(µi;IT) is strictly monotonically decreasing
in µi.
6.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2 (Uniqueness of Equilibrium)
Proof. Equation (6) can be rewritten as follows:
P(µ

























µ?¡´ = 0 (14)
This equation de¯nes µ? and can easily be rearranged to equation (7).
6.2 Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies
The elimination is started at the borders of the dominance ranges. Due to the strict mono-




= µ and µ
1 > µ
0 = µ, such that
P(µ
i;Iµ










0, it also holds that µ
1
> µ
1. For the case of the upper border of the multiplicity
area, this means: Given that the other agents do not invest when receiving signals above
µ
0
, the investment does not pay for signals above µ
1






0). This process can be iterated. Given that the other agents do not invest when
27receiving signals above µ
n









are found by setting the expected payo® di®erence to 0, re°ecting indi®erence

















is decreasing, monotone and bounded. By the common knowledge of




. Concretely, it is possible to






?) = 0 (16)
µ
?
has the interpretation that above this signal all agents do not invest with certainty.
At the lower bound of the multiplicity area, the analogue situation occurs, just with the
sequence µ
n being increasing. There one iterates until one ¯nds:
P(µ
?;Iµ?) = 0 (17)
That means, one iterates until one ¯nds a maximum (minimum) signal at which agent i
is indi®erent between investing and not, and which is at the same time the threshold of the




The switching strategies Iµ? and Iµ
? are Nash equilibria of the private information game.
According to Milgrom and Roberts (1990), in all games with strategic complementarity,
the highest and the lowest equilibrium that resist the iterative elimination of dominated




?, there exists an unambiguous signal µ?, below which in equilibrium
all agents will invest and above which no one invests.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Step 1: E®ect of crisis in A on uncertainty in B, interacted explanatory variable,






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12: Marginal e®ect of uncertainty in B on probability of a crisis there
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